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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TROY 0. NANCE, and
THOMAS B. HANLEY,
Plain tiffs-Respondents
vs.
SHEET METAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
an unincorporated association,
Defendant-Appellant

No. 9631

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
1

This is an action f.or reinstatement to membership in
defendant labor union and for actual and punitive damages for alleged wrongful expulsion of Plaintiffs from
union membership.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The case has previously ibeen appealed to the Supreme
Court where a judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, was reversed. The trial court thereafter refused to give effect
to the reversal and instead entered an Amended Judgment
and Decree that partially affirmed its original judgment.
From such Amended Judgment and Decree, defendant
anpeals.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Amended Judgment
and Decree and entry of judgment in its favor in accordance with the prior decision upon appeal.
STATEMENT OF FAC'TS
This is not an appeal on the merits since the case on
the merits has already been appealed, submitted and decided. The present appeal raises the narrow issue whether
the trial court, after the case had been heard on appeal
and reversed, entered a judgment consistent with the decision of this court. As we shall point out, it clearly did not.
'The appellate deoision in the case (which was then
assigned as No. 9111) was handed down on September 21,
1961, at which time the judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs'1
was reversed. (R. 7-a). The trial court has refused to give
effect to the reversal of its prior decision, however, and,
in an order· dated February 5, 1962, entitled Amended
Judgment and Decree (R. 12-a to 14-a.), it reinstated part
of the judgment which had been reversed. The Supreme
Court reversal has thus been recast by the trial court as a
partial affirmance.
The Plaintiffs in Octoiber of 1961, in their Petition
for Rehearing, asked the Supreme Court to reconsider its
September 21, 1961, decision and grant them the same type
of partial affirmance that the trial court entered on February 5, 1962. Their Petition for Rehearing after being considered by the Court was denied on December 6, 1961. The
1

Refers to P}aintiffs-Respondents, Trov 0. Nance and Thomas B.
Hanley.
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Court thereafter issued its remittitur plainly direeting that
the judgment below was reversed. The remittitur was
worded as follows :
"This cause having been heretofore argued and
submitted and the Court being sufficiently advised in
the premises, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed
that the Judgment of the District Court herein ibe, and
the same is, reversed. Costs before the jury trial to
respondents, and those· thereafter to appellant.''
(R. 6-a).
The first intimation that the trial court did not intend
to carry out the decision of the Supreme Court was given
on January 9, 1962, when counsel for Defendant2 appeared
before Judge Hoyt in Nephi for a hearing on the motions
of both parties to have costs taxed. Counsel for Plaintiffs
did not attend the hearing, although they had been duly
notified thereof. At this hearing the respective costs bills
were discussed, but, in addition, Judge Hoyt made· the
following observations:
''THE COURT : Do you contend that the Supreme
Court ruled upon the holding of the trial court, that
the expulsion was wrongful, or did they avoid ruling
on that!

"MR. SANDACK: Well, I think all you can read
into the Supreme Court's decision is what they have
said in the remittitur which is 'that it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the District
Court herein be, and the same· is, reversed.'
2

Refers to Defendant-Appellant, Sheet Metal Workers International
Association, AFL-CIO.

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Now, the judgment :filed by your Honor included
a :finding, conclusion, and decree that the· expulsion was
illegal. 'The Supreme Court has reversed that finding
and judgment.

*

*

*

*

"THE COURT: .
I do not read anything in
their opinion in which they held that on the facts that
the trial court erred in holding expulsion was wrongful." (R. 25-a to 28-a).
A later intimation that the decision of the Supreme
Court would not he followed and that the trial court would
not acknowledge the appellate decision as a reversal of
the prior judgment was given on January 16, 1962. At that
time Judge Hoyt in an ''Order on Motions for Taxing Costs
and for Discharge of Bonds"2 taxed costs against the respective parties but refused to enter a judgment for costs.
In that Order he said:
''5. The court further concludes that since no judgment has been entered or submitted to this court for
carrying into effect the decision of the Supreme Court
it is premature to enter a judgment for costs at this
time, and that no execution should issue until final
judgment is entered.

*

*

*

*

"7. Counsel for either party may submit conclusions
of law and form of final judgment in conformity with
the opinion and mandate of the Supreme Court."
(Appendix, p. 5).
· Counsel for Defendant thereafter submitted a memorandum to Judge Hoyt in which they pointed out that the
remittitur of the Supreme Court was itself a self-executing
3

This do,cument was through inadvertence not designated as part
of the record on the appeal. It is reproduced in full in the appendix
following the brief, for the convenience of the court.
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final order and that no further order was necessary or
proper, except, of course, a judgment for costs. At the same
time, they tendered to the court a form of "Conclusions of
Law and Judgment," 4 (R. 9-a to 11-a) inasmuch a.s Judge
Hoyt virtually required them to do so.
The pertinent portions of the Conclusions of Law and
Judgment proposed by Defendant, read as follows:
"Now, therefore, the court makes the following
conclusions of law:
'' 1. That the judgment of the trial court in the
cause, above quoted, has been reversed in entirety by
the Supreme Court of Utah.
"2. That pursuant to the remittitur of the
Supreme Court of Utah this court is without power to
do other than enter a judgment of reversal of the judgment heretofore entered by this court and to tax costs
and enter a judgment therefor.
"3. That judgment should be entered for the defendant in the amount of the difference between the
costs taxed against the plaintiff and the costs taxed
against the defendants.
''WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUD,GED
AND DECREED
"1. 'That the judgment in this cause heretofore
entered by the court on the 29th day of June, 1959,
should be, and hereby is, reversed in entirety.
'' 2. That Defendant Sheet Metal Workers International Association be, and it is hereby, given judgment against the plaintiffs, in the sum of $1,718.39, for
court costs.''
• The text of Defendant- Appellant's proposed Conclusions of Law
and Final Judgment is reproduced in full in the appendix to the
brief.
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No draft of Amended Conclusions of Law and Judgment
was proposed or submitted by counsel for Plaintiffs.
Judge Hoyt took final action on Fehruary 5, 1962. On
that date he filed his Amended Conclusions of Law 5 and
Amended Judgment and Decree 6 (R. 12-a to 14-a), in which
he reinstated a portion of the original judgment of June
29, 1959.
The ".Amended Judgment and Decree" provides in
part:
"This court having duly considered the opinion'
and decision of the Supreme Court, and pursuant to
said decision, having made and caused to he entered
herein its Amended Conclusions of Law, now based
upon Findings of Faet heretofore made and entered
herein and upon said Amended Conclusions of La:w
and the· decision and opinion of the Supreme Court,
it is now
''ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as
follows, to-wit :
"1. That the purported expulsion of the petitioner
and intervenor from membership in the respondent
association was and is wrongful, malicious, null and
void as to each of said parties.

*

*

*

*

"5. That this judgment shall not constitute any
adjudication of the truth or falsity of the charges preferred against the petitioner or intervenor and shall
5

e

The Amended Conclusions of Law was also inadvertently omitted
in our designation of the record and therefore is reproduced in full
in the ~ppendix.
The complete text of the Amended Judgment and Decree is repro•
duced in the appendix.
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not operate as a. bar to trial of the charges preferred
against the petitioner and intervenor before a union
tribunal provided such trial is conducted in accordance
with the respondent's constitution and the requirements of law relating to due notice and specific~ation of
charges, reasonable time and opportunity to prepare
for trial, trial before a disinterested and impartial tribunal, and reasonable opportunity to present evidence·
and to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses.''
Defendant respectfully submits that the Amended
Judgment and Decree insofar as it grants affirmative relief
to the Plaintiffs, is not only inconsistent with, but squarely
in opposition to, the decision of the Supreme Court.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE TRIAL COURT BELOW
ERRED IN ENTERING THE AMENDED
JUDGMENT IN THAT THE REMITTITUR OF
THE SUPREME COURT WAS A SELF-EXECUTING ORDER REVERSING THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT BELOW, AND NO FURTHER ORDER TO JUDGMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT WAS NECESSARY OR
PROPER.
The Statement of Facts hereinabove establishes the
err-or of the trial court so convincingly that the argument
on the law can be made in reasonably short form.
The original judgment of the trial court, entered on
June 29, 1959, was predicated upon an adjudication that
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the expulsions of Plaintiffs from membership in Defendant
laibor union were wrongful, null, void, and malicious. This
was not a mere declaration in the abstract; it was the basic
adjudication in the case, from which, or upon the basis of
which, the trial court granted injunctive relief and amerced
the Defendant with punitive damages and an award of fees
to opposing counsel. When the case was reversed on appeal,
the trial court's former judgment was vacated and set
aside.
The trial court, however, refused to acknowledge the
consequences of a reversal and insisted upon granting
Plaintiffs a judgment upon the merits, specifically a judgment as to the validity of the union expulsion proceedings.
It became apparent after several attempts at persuasion
that further efforts o~ the part of Defendant to convince
Judge Hoyt that such action was erroneous would he futile,
even though the law on the subject is well settled.
The effect of a reversal of a judgment by an appellate
court is described in 3 American Jurisprudence 690 as follows:
''To reverse is to vacate· or set aside, but it does
not include any other affirmative action unless specifically directed iby the appellate court.''
In Co~wdery v. London db San Francisco Bank, 139 Cal. 298,
303-304, 73 Pac. 196 (1903), the California Supreme Court
said:
''The legal effect of the order of the Supreme
Court was to reverse and vacate judgment, and not
merely to modify it. Upon a decision of the Supreme
Court that there was material error in the action of
the court below, that court may direct the character of
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the subsequent proceedings in the lower court, and its
mandate will vary according to its views as to the
proper course- to be pursued. . . . To reverse is, 'to
overthrow; set aside ; make- void; annul; repeal; revoke; as to reverse a judgment, sentence, or decree'
(Century Dictionary), or 'to change to the contrary,
or to a former condition' (Standard Dictionary) . . . .
The distinction between a reversal of a judgment and
an affirmance with a modification is too marked and
radical to justify us in disregarding it.''
This matter has also been considered by the Supreme
Court of Utah, in Utah Copper C1o. v. District Court of
Third Judicial District, 91 Utah 377, 64 P. 2d 241, 250
(1937), where this court held:
"The lower court upon remand of a case from a
higher court, must obey the mandate or remittitur and
render judgment in conformity thereto and has no
authority to enter any judgment not in conformity with
the order. Whatever comes before and is decided and
disposed of iby the reviewing court is considered as finally settled, and the inferior court to which a mandate
issues is bound by the decree as the law of the case and
must carry it into execution according to the mandate-,
and after the reviewing court has determined the- case
before it and remanded it to the lower court, the latter
is without power to modify, alter, amend, set aside or
in any manner disturb or depart from the judgment of
the reviewing court, that the judgment of the higher
court is not reviewable in any way by the court below
and the lower court cannot vary or examine the decree
of the· higher court for any other purpose than execution, or give any other or further relief or review it
even for apparent error upon any matter decided on
appeal, or meddle with it further than to settle so much
as has been remanded."
9
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The most recent case in point in Utah is Phebus v. Dunr
ford, 114 Utah 292, 198 P. 2d 973 (1948). In P,he1bus, a trial
court judgment had been reversed in the Supreme Court
of Utah and subsequently the trial court, upon motion, set
aside its former judgment as to some, but not all, of the
original defendants. The Defendant against whom the
judgment was not set aside brought a writ of mandate in
the Supreme Oourt to require the trial court to set its entire
decision aside. The court there said :
'' [2] The lower court should not have entertained
the motion to set aside the former decision. The decision of this court when filed in the lower court automatica.l.ly set the low'er court's decision aside withou.t further action by that court. Our decision did not direct
the lower court to take action to vacate its former decision. It acted directly upon the lower court's decision
and effectually vacated and set aside that decision. Our
decision waiS without limitation as to how mruch of the
lower court's decision was set aside. It set it all aside.
After the filing of the remittitur from this court in the
lower court, there was nothing upon which such a motion could properly have been predicated.'' (Emphasis
ours.)
These Utah cases not only state the current law of
Utah on the issue but also are in accord with general authority on the effect of the reversal of a judgment by an appellate court. Under the Utah rule, the remittitur of the
Supreme Court in the present case, once it was filed, acted
directly upon the judgment of the trial court, reversing it
in toto. From and after December 8, 1961, the· date on which
the remittitur in this case was filed with the Clerk of the
Distric~t C'ourt, there was no judgment on the merits of the
case for the trial court to amend or modify. The only
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authority vested in the trial court after that date was to
enter a judgment for costs, in accordance with the directions of the remittitur.
Judge Hoyt plainly erred when he entered the
Amended Judgment and Decree granting affirmative relief
to Plaintiffs. Such action subverted the effect of the
Supreme Court's previous reversal, and constitutes an attempt at usurpation of appellate power by the trial court.

POINT 2. THE TRIAL COURT BELOW
ERRED IN ENTERING THE AMENDED
JUDGMENT IN THAT SUCH AMENDED
JUDGMENT WAS NOT IN CONFORMITY
WITH AND WAS CONTRARY TO THE REMITTITUR AND THE OPINION OF THE.
SUPREME COURT ENTERED IN THE CASE
ON THE INITIAL APPEAL.
As we have shown in the argument under Point 1, the
trial court should not have entered any Amended J udgment and Decree on the merits of the case. However, the
Supreme Court in the Phebus case, supra, seems: to indicate
that, while appellate judgments of unqualified reversal are
self-executing orders upon which no further trial court action should be based, entry of judgment upon the remittitur
may constitute, at most, harmless error if the subsequent
lower court judgment is in confornlity with the appellate
decision. Thus, in Phebus, the Court said:
''Assuming it were proper for that court [the District
Court] to act, it should have set its entire decision
aside for the reasons indicated above, and not limited
its order to a. part only of its former decision.
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

''Merely for the sake of clearing the record, the
lower court should enter an order setting its entire de0ision aside without limitation.''
The form of Conclusions of Law and Judgment proposed by Defendant (R. 9-a to 11-a) would have been consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion and remittitur,
and should have heen entered if a further order respecting
the merits of the case was to be made.
The Amended Conclusions of Law and Amended J udgment and Decree entered by Judge Hoyt granted substantial affirmative relief to the Plaintiffs. This was wholly inconsistent with and opposed to the judgment on appeal and
the remittitur. The resulting final order is erroneous and
highly prejudicial to the Defendant, the prevailing party.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons given, the Amended Judgment and
Decree entered by Judge Hoyt on February 5, 1962, should
be reversed and set aside, except for paragraph 6 thereof
where judgment for costs is granted. Defendant prays that
this court will direct the trial court to vacate and set aside
its Amended Judgment and Decree except to the extent
that the same grants judgment to Defendant in the sum of
One Thousand Seven Hundred and Eighteen Dollars and
Thirty-Nine Cents ($1,718.39), or, in the alternative, that
the Supreme Court enter the appropriate final judgment in
the case and incorporate the same in its remittitur.
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Respectfully submitted,
A. W. Sandack
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Donald W. Fishe:r
740 National Bank Building
Toledo 4, Ohio

Of Counsel:
Draper, Sandack & Draper
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Mulholland, Robie & Hickey
740 National Bank Building
Toledo 4, Ohio
Dated: April '2/J, 1962
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